INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ADVANCE RESEARCH
IN MULTIDISCIPLINARY

Interstate water disputes present a critical challenge to federal governance, pitting sub-national claims over a vital, finite resource against the need for national harmony and economic stability. This paper undertakes a doctrinal and institutional comparison of the legal frameworks for resolving such disputes in India and the United States, two of the world’s largest and most complex federal democracies. The analysis interrogates the institutional design, legal doctrines, and practical efficacy of India’s legislative-tribunal model, established under the Inter-State Water Disputes Act of 1956, and the U.S. model, which relies predominantly on the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the use of interstate compacts. The study finds that India’s framework, premised on ad hoc tribunals, suffers from profound procedural delays, weak enforcement mechanisms, and the politicisation of disputes, undermining the finality of awards. In contrast, the U.S. system, centred on the judicial doctrine of 'equitable apportionment,' offers greater legal certainty and enforcement power through Supreme Court decrees, while simultaneously encouraging negotiated interstate compacts as a more flexible, proactive solution. The U.S. emphasis on interstate compacts provides a valuable template for cooperative federalism that is underdeveloped in the Indian context. This study concludes by proposing modest, implementable reforms for India, tethered to lessons from the U.S. experience, aimed at enhancing efficiency, promoting data-driven negotiation, and strengthening the finality and enforceability of adjudicatory awards, thereby reducing the significant economic and social costs of protracted water conflicts.